ORGANIC GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIALIZATION OF CIVILIZATION

Sheldon Lee Gosline

No thing great is created suddenly,
any more than a bunch of grapes or a fig.
If you tell me that you desire a fig,
I answer you that there must be time.
Let it first blossom, then bear fruit, then ripen.
Epictetus, The Discourses, I, 15

In his key note address abstract for the 2000 International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSC) in Limerick, Scotland, Manuel Castells made a point which happens to lie near to the core of my own current research interests. He observed that the speed of technological innovation requires a parallel development of institutional and cultural innovation, away from bureaucracy but closer to people, to ensure the sustainability of the new economy, and to spur the new wave of technological creativity (Castells 2000).

I will argue that this parallel development of institutional and cultural innovation is a societal process that has been around at least since the dawn of human civilization and is socialization. The verb �to socialize,� simply means to make social, or to make fit for life in companionship with others. It is how a group identifies itself as both unique from other groups and united for a common purpose.

Throughout known history, group leaders have found it necessary to humanize institutions and develop cultural innovations based on core values, away from pure bureaucracy and closer to the people�s ideological values. Often leaders have called upon their people to engage in major projects, some of which have left impressive archaeological remains, while others (such as war) tend to destroy. An excellent example of a constructive project is the wave of pyramid building of Old Kingdom Egypt, and its subsequent revival in the Middle Kingdom. The first pyramid was part of a massive effort to solidify the ruler�s supremacy over each aspect of the society. By the time of King Djoser, Egypt had been politically unified for several generations, however in terms of socialization, there were still strong religious / political centers throughout the land. The religious structure of phyles appeared during the governmental socialization of the Old Kingdom, but emerged from a more ancient organic institution of clans with totemic emblems, with its roots preceding the First Dynasty (Roth 1991: 8; 145-195; 208-9). To show the king�s authority over various districts, a complex system of royal visitations was devised, where the king visited regional shrines to do homage for local gods. Thereby, he demonstrated supremacy over the entire land. King Djoser�s genius was in bringing facsimiles of every major shrine to the capital itself, where he would symbolically do homage to all the gods at once. The gods came to him! Furthermore, his master architect, Imhotep, took the plan further by producing, or reproducing, the entire pageant backdrop as the stage for the ruler�s own funerary monument at Saqqara.

A similar constructive socialization event was carried out by King Louis XIV of France, who brought the entire French court to Versailles; a site that had previously only been a royal hunting lodge. In both instances, the ruler not only consolidated his power base, but also created an image of national identity. The long-term success of Djoser�s scheme was far greater than Louis XIV�s. Djoser�s vision led to massive pyramidal building projects that fueled a divine kingship for several centuries, while Versailles became the last French palace. Indeed, the French Revolution is an excellent example from history of the ruling class becoming too remote and isolated from the needs and concerns of the population they governed. It was a direct result of the French aristocracy becoming too out of touch with its own society. In such cases, instability soon followed until a new leadership arose to ensure stability, and a return to the sustainability of the other force at work, globalization. On the surface, the two monumental building projects look the same. Price would see each as �a large chunk of fossilized energy permanently removed from general circulation� (Price 1978: 165), but it is better to think of this type of building project as a socialization investment. The KEY point is this� Such an investment will pay well only if it is closely linked to broadly based traditional social values. However, even a successful system has its limitations. Near the center of the Egyptian kingdom, the royal mortuary cults were staffed by a complex system of periodic service, which drew cult functionaries from the civil bureaucracy and contributed to a stable integration of the religious and political establishments of the state, thereby enforcing the socialization process. However, in a small provincial cult, relatively distant from the capital and controlling a much smaller amount of endowment land, a more traditional patrimonial system existed, akin to the family-centered temple organizations found in Mesopotamia (Roth 1987: 115-122). The pyramid age did end, as we all know since we are no longer building pyramids, except for use as casinos. The agricultural support system needed to sustain massive labor forces and religious establishments became over extended and the ever increasing bureaucracy of the temple complexes became top heavy and inefficient. By the end of the Old Kingdom, the Egyptian kings could only dream of constructing shabby pyramids that were pale reflections of the 4th dynasty�s massive monuments to royal ego. Still, rulers from the Middle Kingdom revived the idea of pyramids, and again much later in the Kushite Kingdom of the Sudan. The pyramid proved to be a great tool of socialization that even was exportable and adapted to other social environments (Lehner 1997).

Finding a link between Socialization and Globalization There is a small but growing tendency to link the term socialization with that of globalization. A quick internet search reveals currently 19 �hits� for �socialization and globalization� and just eight for �globalization and socialization�. I would not venture to say why the former order is currently more than twice as popular, but perhaps it reflects a desire to put society first. The subjects concerned with linking these two concepts range from sublime literary criticism (www.aucegypt.edu/facstaff/bulletin/FBApr0603.html) to ridiculous studies of punk sub-culture (www.ursis.com/LAS/archives/features/ media/globalization/).

The phase is used positively by at least one city government think-tank in China (http://www.getgd.net/gd_city/sd_gaikuang_e.html) to express their development projects, while several religious groups in America used this phrase to express numerous evils of a �New World Order� (www.cuttingedge.org/news/n1395.cfm, and also www.webaccess.net/~comminc/Plunge.html). I suspect that in both cases we are seeing knee jerk reactions. In nearly post-Communist China, socialization still sounds like a positive thing, with a semblance to socialism. For Americans, such an association is negative. The phrase �globalization and socialization� dominates economic and political discussions. Nowhere, in any of these citations, is there a clear discussion of how the two forces interact.

So what exactly is globalization? According to Maria Livanos Cattaui, globalization is �the flow of information, technology, ideas, goods, services, capital and people across borders, with rules-based agreements particularly for flows of trade and investment.� Her position, with which I would agree, is that globalization is a process with a long history (Cattaui 2001). David Held also expressed the idea that globalization is not new (Held 2001). He elaborates, �If you think of the spread of world religions, the huge development of empires in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the stretch of the British Empire: global cultural and economic phenomena are not new. But there have been different historical forms of globalization, and the contemporary conjuncture is new.� From the 1870�s to 1914 there was a more open flow of capital than in today�s markets. But today, we are seeing many more participants, with communications as the engine. The extent and intensity of communications is far greater than telegraph, steamship or railroad. Perhaps the most important aspect of modern globalization, is that it has broken free from the socialization force of territorial empires, mostly with the aid of private corporations and multilateral groupings (Held 2001). I believe that the new element is the rate and volume of globalization, which is now completely overwhelming the socialization process, at its own pearl. Furthermore, forces of globalization are far greater than socialization for the first time in world history. This not only threatens all exiting nation states, but also threatens human social patterns as developed for at least the past 6000 years.

To come extent, Karl Marx foresaw our current globalization development, which he refers to as the �bourgeoisie.� In his Manifesto he wrote, �The bourgeoisie [globalization], by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image� (Marx and Engels, 1888). Of course, Marx not only observes, he also values and his assessment of the globalization process is far from favorable. That fact should not distract from his ability to observe how it functions.

For this and other reasons, I see the primary tension in all human systems to be a delicate interplay between the forces of socialization and globalization. For much of human history, socialization has dominated. There have been punctuated episodes or flourishes of globalization, when ideas and products exchanged more freely. Perhaps the earliest recorded event of this nature was the Amarna Period in ancient Egypt. Another example is the Italian Renaissance. Certain aspects of the Tang Dynasty of China could be added to the list of globalization eras, along with the Periclean Age of ancient Greece. Despite these bursts of connective energy, certain socio-political forces always held control. That long-standing delicate balance was finally tipped in the favor of globalization by the final decades of the twentieth century, in large part due to a rapid growth of information technology. What this will mean in decades to come is yet unclear, but there are crucial patterns we can see in history from periods following similarly intense globalization.

These two forces somewhat function in a way that resembles magnetic polarity. But they both repel and attract one another in ways that defy magnetism. By its nature, socialization attracts together what it identifies as being the same. Primarily, this sameness is defined as language, cultural habits, foods, living patterns, dwelling styles into positively charged nuclei. As these social groups expand, they encounter other groups. If there is sufficient association between the two, they may unite into a single larger group, or they may repel, just as two, similarly charged ends of a magnate will repel. The larger and more established the groups in question are, the more likely they will repel despite their similarities, or indeed, because of their similarities. The force of globalization, which has now come to dominate human experience, functions both within the structure of individual social groups and dominates extra-group interactions. Globalization is essentially characterized by a key role of knowledge and information exchange within and between groups. As a force, it spurs productivity and enhances competitiveness. By its global reach and by its network form of business organization, it breaks down all borders established by the process of socialization, including the borders established by the core group from which that particular globalization force originally sprang. It is both the product of successful socialization and potentially harmful to it.

Perhaps the best scientific model to explain what I mean by this interplay between globalization and socialization is found in basic atomic structures. Elements of socialization are akin to the core of a given atom, while globalization is a force like the electrons racing around the atomic core. Larger atoms have more electrons. In the same way, a larger and more defined social group is more likely to originate and sustain more globalization forces. Two centuries ago, this played itself out as colonization. Now it functions as market or corporate imperialism. Also, a more unstable atom is likely to lose electrons. Likewise, a group that is poorly held together by a common socialization is more likely to lose globalization strength to another group. We will explore this analogy further, but first I wish to point out examples of how an overly developed force of socialization can stifle, rather than foster, globalization. Atomically speaking, this would be parallel to the nucleus of an atom being so dense that the electrons collapse into the core of protons and neutrons.

There are instances in which globalization has been forcibly repressed by existing social structures. If you will allow me to digress, I will relate a story to illustrate this point, which I first read in childhood, (Brandbury 1973). �In the year A.D. 400, the Emperor Yuan held his throne by the Great Wall of China, and the land was green with rain, readying itself toward the harvest, at peace, the people in his domain neither too happy nor too sad.

Early in the morning of the first day of the first week of the second month of the new year, the Emperor Yuan was sipping tea and fanning himself against a warm breeze when a servant ran across the scarlet blue garden tiles, calling, 'Oh, Emperor, Emperor, a miracle!' ... The miracle was that a man was flying...

�The Emperor looked into the sky. And in the sky, laughing so high that you could hardly hear him laugh, was a man; and the man was clothed in bright papers and reeds to make wings and a beautiful yellow tail, and he was soaring all above like the largest bird in a universe of birds, like a new dragon in a land of ancient dragons.

The man called down to them from high in the cool winds of morning, 'I fly, I fly!'

The servant waved to him. 'Yes, yes!'

The Emperor Yuan did not move. Instead, he looked at the Great Wall of China now taking shape out of the farthest mist in the green hills, that splendid snake of stones that writhed with majesty across the entire land. That wonderful wall which had protected them for a timeless time from enemy hordes and preserved peace for years without number...�

After learning that no one else had seen the flying man, the Emperor had him called down. The man was instantly seized by royal guards and the executioner was ready. The man pleaded for his life and told the Emperor of the beauty of flying.

�'Yes,' said the Emperor sadly, 'I know it must be true. For I felt my heart move with you in the air and I wondered: What is it like? How does it feel? How do the distant pools look from so high? And how my houses and servants? Like ants? And how the distant towns not yet awake?'

'Then spare me!'

'But there are times,' said the Emperor, more sadly still, 'when one must lose the beauty if one is to keep what little beauty one already has. I do not fear you, yourself, but I fear another man.'

'What man?'

'Some other man who, seeing you, will build a thing of bright papers and bamboo like this. But the other man will have an evil face and an evil heart, and the beauty will be gone. It is this man I fear.'�

So the Emperor had the man immediately executed, the flying machine destroyed, and the servants sworn to secrecy. I have pondered that story many years. After the tragic events of September 11th, and their aftermath, we in the West are beginning to understand the Emperor�s position concerning the dangers of technology in the wrong hands. Are we learning the wrong lessons? Are our leaders attempting to stifle globalization, as the emperor did, or are they attempting to stifle competing forces of socialization? Most importantly to ask is whether either approach is a means to solving the current crisis?

The Emperor�s response stifled Chinese technological developments. Seemingly, all the factors had been present in China for the industrial revolution, but it did not happen there. Instead, it happened in the backwater of civilization, northern Europe. Why? It was the late Sinologist Joseph Needham who first eloquently stated this conundrum. The answer is far simpler than anyone could imagine. China has historically had a socialization system that is so oppressively strong that there is little room for the kind of creative forces associated with globalization to flourish. Even the complex system of Chinese writing presents a daunting social pattern, intended to control thought patterns into predetermined paths. Only the rare individual can break out of such a system, or dare to question it, and the result is usually negative. But China�s system is also the oldest, and therefore can be considered as the most successful � a point to which I will return.

The greatest methodological problem that scholars face in interpreting archaeological data for archaic states is in establishing causal links to support or reject conflict or integration positions. I will spare you the theoretical speculations, which can be found in my full-length essay. Turning to the original authors themselves, it is possible to extract some useful principles. As already noted, Marx envisioned our current globalization, �Modern industry has established the world-market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its time, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages. � The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe� (Marx and Engels 1888). His view of prior conditions is rather na�ve and utopian. By contrast, Charles Darwin�s exploration of species diversification, which is less directly associated with human society, is more analogous to the process of socialization. We can extract a principle from Darwin; that distinctions between social groups did not occur immediately, but resulted from population pressure and competition for resources. Darwin�s states, �It seems clear that organic beings must be exposed during several generations to new conditions to cause any great amount of variation; and that, when the organization has once begun to vary, it generally continues varying for many generations. No case is on record of a variable organism ceasing to vary under cultivation. Our oldest cultivated plants, such as wheat, still yield new varieties: our oldest domesticated animals are still capable of rapid improvement or modification.� Likewise, his observations concerning competition between species for existence parallel the global limitations that social groups face, �as more individuals are produced than can possibly survive, there must in every case be a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of the same species [= social groups], or with the individuals of distinct species [= social groups], or with the physical conditions of life. It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms; for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food, and no prudential restraint from marriage. Although some species [= social groups] may be now increasing, more or less rapidly, in numbers, all cannot do so, for the world would not hold them� (Darwin 1860). My direct association of his point to social groups is not out of line, because the doctrine from which Charles Darwin has drawn this point, that of Thomas R. Malthus, concerns human population, and how it was kept in check. Malthus saw the �struggle for existence� as the great stimulus for labor and a cause of human improvement. He also wrote, �It is an obvious truth, which has been taken notice of by many writers, that population must always be kept down to the level of the means of subsistence; but no writer that the Author recollects has inquired particularly into the means by which this level is effected.� Furthermore, Malthus notes, �the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man.� Three of his main conclusions are as follows: �That population cannot increase without the means of subsistence is a proposition so evident that it needs no illustration. That population does invariably increase where there are the means of subsistence, the history of every people that have ever existed will abundantly prove. And that the superior power of population cannot be checked without producing misery or vice, the ample portion of these too bitter ingredients in the cup of human life and the continuance of the physical causes that seem to have produced them bear too convincing a testimony� (Malthus 1798). Accordingly, one of the chief aims of socialization is to regulate population. Hence, the breakdown of traditional social structures through rampant globalization yields both increased population and wide scale social unrest. Interestingly, the world currently faces these two major problems.

A New Paradigm Based on Globalization and Socialization

The interaction between Globalization and Socialization resolves an old anthropological debate concerning links between conflict and increased social integration. Conflict chiefly arises in response to tensions within the globalization / socialization dichotomy, while integration is the positive and balanced result of globalization and socialization functioning in harmony and in balance. The man with the flying machine represents the technologically driven globalization of our current age. The emperor�s fear was that he would lose control. The counterbalance of interest between globalization and socialization is clearly functioning in this example to create a non-emergence of a technological breakthrough that would have hurled the Chinese state far forward than any other state at the time. By extension, we could imagine localized socialization conditions that would not allow the creation of any state at all. This model allows for this possibility, as an equally relevant fact of the actual formation of states. While many causal factors lead to state development, trends of increasing political complexity are evident in widely divergent societies, until they collapse.

Our modern situation, involving intense globalization, is fueled by technology, but technology alone has not always been the main driving force of globalization. Karl Marx was no friend of globalization. He clearly perceived it as the enemy of the social fabric and traditional systems, leading to a world with little or no diversity. �The bourgeoisie [globalization] has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. �They [old established industries] are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature� (Marx and Engels 1888). Largely, Marx points out aspects of globalization that are potentially good. We have a modern perception that all societies and the factors that influence them are neither infinitely particular nor widely general. Just as when we eat a potato or piece of corn, we do not ask, �Where does it come from?� or �How was it grown?� so too, our pre-conceived paradigms about society are increasingly global. The danger is that we do not even stop to ask what it is about a given society, past or present, that makes it function as it does. Let us then consider several ethnocentric positions concerning technology and information we in the West are prone to accept uncritically:

1) that increased technology is basically good; inventions will ALWAYS make life better and solve problems, including problems created by pre-existing technologies.
2) that increased communication is basically good; the more quickly ideas get transferred and the bigger the web of communication the faster problems will be solved.
3) that increased commerce is basically good; leading to higher living standards of all involved, or what is good for business is good for everyone.
4) that relatively greater technology and faster communication is the hallmark of more developed civilizations and, conversely, less technology and slower communication is the hallmark of backward societies.
5) that wise leaders always embrace technology and communication while foolish ones react like Emperor Yuan, and reject innovations.
6) that in some sort of �survival of the fittest� model, those technologically advanced civilizations will always beat out the technologically backwards ones.

To support this paradigm, historians are quick to cite the Spanish with their greater technology easily vanquishing the Incas and Aztecs; of course ignoring factors such as disease, a standing army with nothing to do at the end of the reconquista, native American political struggles, coincidence, timing and blind luck. With closer scrutiny, Alan Kolata and other researchers have been able to discern how the native American cohesive systems of nobles oblige worked against their ability to defend against the invading snatch and grab empire building (Kolata 1997). A millennium before the Incas built their empire, the city of Tiahuanaco sat at the center of a great empire of its own. Located on Lake Titicaca, the world�s highest at 13,000 feet, in what is now Bolivia, at the very limits of agriculture, the people of Tiahuanaco developed an ingenious system of cultivation based on raised planting beds alternating with trenches that served as irrigation ditches. From A.D. 400 to 800, the temples of Tiahuanaco glittered with gold and the empire supported as many as 250,000 people. They were not destroyed by the impact of globalization, when the Spanish arrived. Instead the Aymara formed a spiritual bond with nature that industrialized society fails to comprehend. In their culture, which survives to this day, time and space merge; to provide them with a strong coherent socialization that provides them a lasting identity (Kolata 1996). In this instance, globalization has fostered socialization. This process has sometimes been called �secondary state formation� (Esse 1989: 81-96), but the process can even occur without the creation of a secondary state.

The archaeological record is filled with data concerning the processes of globalization and socialization that scholars have mostly ignored. Rather than questioning the core concepts, or searching for an engine, scholars focus on developing increasingly elaborate models for stages of social development to explain how and why the �laws� don�t really explain observable conditions. In short, existing archaeological models are inherently flawed because they are unidirectional and progressive in their outlook, assuming that greater complexity equates to improved conditions. They fail to explore the ever-present tension and cooperation between the internally driven force of socialization in the local group and the externally driven force of globalization.

The concept of secondary state formation comes close to dealing with this issue, but only to the extent that it observes the most transparent factors. In the �old world� most states, other than Egypt and Mesopotamia, were secondary, and the result of a globalization force from the earlier state, interacting with developing states. The appearance of a secondary state is by definition the result of regular interaction and/or competition with expanding states, vis-�-vis non-state-organized populations (Price 1978: 161-86). Warfare has long been noted as a factor of cultural interaction (Cohen 1985). Two additional case studies are Habuba Kabira South in northern Syria, and Ebla in Syria (Buccelatti 1967).

The forces of increased technology and faster communication, culminating in globalization, is neither good nor bad in itself, just as strong forces of socialization are neither good nor bad. The technologically fit society does not always have the survival edge, not does the society with strong traditions. Each case must be considered individually. That survival and development of a given human society is dependent on a far more complex set of influences, stretching back to remote antiquity, into what seems to us as a pre-technological dark age of conceptual isolationism. I will elaborate on the complexity of these factors, but in general, it consists of a balance between a desire for innovative exchange (globalization) and conservative values that define the group (socialization).

Here is an example to illustrate my point. In numerous instances, state officials have employed imagery and texts to establish their legitimacy of authority. The archaeological record from many regions attests to this fact. Carved stamp or cylinder seals from Greece, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, India and China all attest to this principle. The administrative system in the Third Dynasty of Ur is an excellent example of this particular type of socialization. This period witnessed an unprecedented standardization of cylinder seal designs, as pointed out by Irene Winter (Winter 1987: 59-99). This Ur III period also corresponds to an equally unprecedented concentration of and distribution of resources within a highly centralized bureaucracy. Within the administrative system, the seals functioned as both coinage and identity cards, serving as markers of systemic unity and indicating an individual�s place within the system. The imagery and text on the seals argued for both the king�s and the official�s legitimacy. Thus, on several levels, these seals were powerful markers of socialization. Interestingly, the standardization of these seals as indicators of rank and status may be unique to the Ur III period, representing in particular the control exerted by king �ulgi, and the rulers immediately following him. In later periods of Mesopotamian history, seals were not used in the same way and, of course, they are not used that way in modern day Iraq.

As a group becomes larger, it gains increased opportunity for exchange. It also requires more complex symbols and systems to exert its own unity, such as King �ulgi�s innovative use of cylinder seals to promote and legitimize his power base. However, in Mesopotamia the use of seals in this way ended, as it did in much of the ancient world at various times. The system ended in India after the Harappan period. In Egypt, the administrative cylinder seals gave way to scarab seals, which had less of an administrative purpose than a religious and commemorative purpose. In Persia and Greece the seals became personal signet rings. In China, the People�s Republic still uses administrative stamp seals. When I lived in China, my students encouraged me to take a Chinese name and have a stamp seal carved. There are stamp seal carvers in every corner of the public marketplaces. No official document is without at least one official stamp seal, and to get permission for legal events of a social nature, such as a marriage, legal paperwork must have the stamp seal from each tier of authority � from the apartment block leader, to the district official, to the regional office, to the provincial office. At each stage, if a lower ranking stamp seal is missing from a document, approval is denied and the petitioner is sent down the hierarchy rungs to obtain the proper stamp seal. The question that no one has bothered to ask is why did this ancient system of administrative seals never end in China?

Socialization is the implementation of societal codes that provide definition and cohesion, even loyalty to the group. We see evidence of this in the names given to work groups working on the great pyramid of Khufu in Giza. They proudly wrote their patriotic slogans on the massive blocks buried over the main burial chamber. One can easily imagine a competition to get them in place. Some socialization codes are constructed by an elite, such as their administrative seals, while others are more ancient, predating the elite, but used by them to exert and maintain authority (Kemp 1989, reprint 1994).

Sometimes such codes become too specialized, so that when an intrusive system appears, the elite become helpless to call upon the defensive forces of socialization. This was one of the major factors in the Spanish conquest of Latin America. The Native American civilizations had systems that were completely undermined by the invading forces. Like globalization, this socialization is a basic form of human interaction. It preserves society. It makes us feel safe. It is either in anticipation to or response to a threatening force of globalization, and as such is perceived by the forces behind that globalization movement as terrorism. It is also manifest in laws, cultural habits or even a flag waving on a car, driving down the road, in protest of �terrorism�.

It must be stressed again that neither globalization nor socialization is good or bad, and the one needs the other, otherwise a given society goes into decline. For example, the political, technological and cultural isolationism of Ching dynasty China and the Roman Empire�s intense polymorphic internationalism of �anything goes� both led to corruption and decline. Constant growth and development of a civilization requires a healthy balance of both forces. What Marxist models view as thresholds of development (clan, tribe, chieftain, state, and empire) are simply manifestations of the socialization responses to a given need or localized advantage, which may be fueled internally or externally by forces of globalization. Marxism inherently views all change as being socially driven. By contrast, the perspective of evolutionary models is more in tune with forces of innovative globalization. In that paradigm, society is basically static, until some external or internal variation pops up. There is nothing in the makeup of any society to suggest that it evolves over time. What is Egyptian, was always Egyptian. What is Roman, was always Roman. The one cultural paradigm will never become the other one and as long as there are Egyptians and Romans, some aspects of Egyptian and Roman culture will always persist. Probably the greatest effort to exterminate a people and culture was committed by the Nazi�s, carried out with misplaced goals of evolutionary zeal. It was tragic, but it also failed. Adaptation and selection (or rejection) of the new element is the only driving force in the evolutionary model. As such, it is also incorrect.

In fact, there is a built in catch-22 situation, which prevents globalization from completely dominating, even now in our age of instant communication. As any given social group expands its sphere of influence to create a cultural hegemony, it encounters other social groups that confront it, both aggressively and passively. The only way for an invading force to be successfully accepted by other social groups is for that invading force to adopt the socialization markers of the conquered group(s). Such apparently submissive gestures of reconciliation are counterintuitive to any invader. It is little wonder that this tactic has rarely been carried off tactfully. Alexander the Great was perhaps the first leader to pull this maneuver off with any amount of finesse, however his subordinates were often bewildered by his esprit de corps with the natives, as he became Pharaoh in Egypt and Silkunder in India. The concept did not last beyond his life, as his generals carved up his empire. What Alexander managed to pull off amounts to a parlor trick slight of hand when compared to the present day localized social groups acting against globalization. We define the most aggressive units as terrorists, and their numbers inevitably will grow in step with growing globalization, unless our leaders can achieve a similar identity makeover as Alexander accomplished.

Furthermore, globalization, or the intense interconnectedness of idea exchange, is a basic byproduct of all human creativity and interaction. It comes from a very human desire to learn about others and other places. For example, the creator of the flying machine interacting with Emperor Yuan was a microcosm of the globalization process that failed. Alexander the Great brought about a globalization process that succeeded, for a time. When such a contact is productive, the byproduct serves to fuel increased contact. As a counterbalance, socialization is an intense compartmentalization of ideas, exemplified by Emperor Yuan. It is also exemplified by Alexander, but for different reasons.

I am not proposing that societies or even individuals persist unchanged. The key to understanding what fuels change in human society is in part a reconciliation between these two paradigms, Marxism and Darwinism, which separately, by themselves, fail to explain why change occurs. The way a particular social group is patterned to deal with situations truly shapes that society. That is what I will be referring to as �societal DNA�. Of course, there is no single factor sufficient to shape all societies. What would function as a catalyst for change in one, would destroy another, just as one plant prefers dry acidic soil and another prefers wet base soil. The many factors acting upon each human social group are without a doubt multivarient. What is not multivarient is how a particular group is likely to respond. That is what we need to study in order to begin understanding the processes of human society.

As a model, systems theory is generally headed in the right direction. It creates testable hypotheses, not complete accounts of state formation incidences. These are human creations, subject to the vagaries of human existence and random chance. We must recognize that something as simple as the untimely death of one�s leader can have profound consequences on history (as it did on the Mongol hordes), and there is nothing like a hurricane to crush an incipient rebellion and unite individuals in a rebuilding effort. However, the specific response of one social group may be very different from the response of another. It is important to note that these responses are not random. They are encoded in the particular group�s socialization. Charles Spencer discusses the effect of the eruption of the volcano Xitle as a precipitating event for the conquest of Cuicuilco by the early Mesoamerican state of Teotihuacan (Spencer 1990: 22). As noted above, the consequence of this randomizing factor is that we never know exactly what parts of the system have priority in a given society, rendering prediction impossible. In no way do I mean to imply that because a system is stable (has achieved equilibrium or homeostasis) that it is �adaptive�, to use a much-misused term. As Rappaport notes, �Social systems ... can make mistakes of which biological systems may be incapable� (Rappaport 1977: 51). Still, recognizing this fact, we should proceed with the knowledge that even an imperfect system is not a random aggregate, but a structured, somewhat predictable grouping. Above all, the focus of our investigation needs to be in the realm of monitoring social responses to situations, not the situations themselves.

The Organic Nature of Globalization and Socialization

Now that we have established that a delicate balance between globalization and socialization fuels all change in society, I will endeavor to illustrate how complex human societies follow an organic process of birth, growth, decay and sometimes renewal through the developments of socialization, the catalysis of globalization, and continual interplay between the two. This force of connectivity motivates all change, now and throughout antiquity. The proper model for this change is neither evolutionary transformation, nor jumps from one stage of development to another. By �organic,� I mean both a natural process of human interaction with the exchange of ideas and that this human process correlates with adaptations that an organic creature might make to changing environmental conditions.

This perspective introduces a new goal for anthropology � to search for something akin to societal DNA, or put another way, that the semiotics of a culture should be viewed as its genetic code. This societal DNA functions in much the same way as biological DNA. The strength to survive comes from the core elements, i.e.: societal DNA, of a given culture reapplied and reinterpreted, simultaneously making use of borrowed and foreign elements when useful. This concept should not be confused with biological determinism. Carneiro made such an egregious conclusion, placing descriptive characteristics of states above factors causing them. He noted that the number of autonomous political entities extant in the world has declined steadily from the human beginnings to the present, and that as the number of states grows smaller, their size grows larger - fair enough, so far. He then asserted that the curve of declining polities leads inevitably to the emergence of a world state (Carneiro 1978: 222). To do so, he invoked a principle of competitive exclusion (an idea borrowed from biological evolution), which states that two species cannot coexist using the same niche indefinitely, and one will eventually prevail, forcing the other to evolve or die out (Carneiro: 1978: 221). We must also consider whether conditions of harsh competition and warfare required for this model actually existed. Furthermore, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that a world state is inevitable. Carneiro confuses directionality with teleology. It is entirely unknown where the curve of autonomous polities might be leading. We cannot predict where social developments may go, simply because they do not �go� anywhere at all. Rather, processes of globalization and socialization, acting at the present, shape a future without any inherent goal or endpoint. Even now, new socialization units are emerging though a primary tool of globalization, the internet. One of the most popular features of that communication tool is the �chat room� where people can meet and socialize over a topic of common interest. Who is to say that these social groupings may not someday form into distinct socio-political units, thereby subverting the same integrative system that created those same groups.

Societal DNA is most easily associated in our thinking with socialization, but it also determines how a group will interact through globalization. Some groups are missionaries by virtue of the cultural template to which they are subscribing. Islam and the Church of Latter Day Saints clearly fall into this category, while Judaism primarily functions in the realm of socialization. The key point is that any given societal DNA will concern itself differently with globalization and socialization. A primary globalization function of societal DNA is how it defines and deals with foreigners, either in peace or at war, at home or abroad. Concerns of sexuality and procreation are major ways that societal DNA functions in matters of socialization. Jewelry, body ornamentation, rituals, rights of passage and even toys all serve to shape the gender constructs of a groups members (Gosline 1999; Turner 1969 ).

Sometimes, amazing changes in social structures happen through the process of globalization. When people in the river valleys of the Fertile Crescent needed more food they borrowed and applied the growing of grains, first developed by people living at a higher elevation... leading to the earliest civilizations. They did not simply grow the grain the same way, but developed new methods to suit their environmental conditions. When Egyptians wanted a governmental system and symbols of authority they borrowed artistic and architectural elements from Mesopotamia, including administrative seals, but soon after the Egyptians made their own new corpus of semiotic indicators, according to their own socialization template. For example, we know that human sacrifices were carried out at Ur in Mesopotamia, at sites such as the grave of King A-bar-gi (Woolley 1965). In Egypt, we have no conclusive evidence of human sacrifices, but some Predynastic pallets depict human sacrifice and some hymns in the Pyramid Texts indicate ritual cannibalism of all the Egyptian gods and men, to take on all of their powers (Wilson 1951: 52, 85, 146-7, 151). The Egyptian cases are probably borrowed references to Mesopotamian practice.

Linguistically, we also see globalization at work. When the Caananites needed a writing system, they borrowed Egyptian hieratic phonetic signs and developed the first alphabet... with far reaching influence. Their language did not evolve into Egyptian; they maintained and promoted their own language by adapting a borrowed symbolic structure with phonetic values. Written English came about the same way, which explains why there are so many sounds without proper letters; ie: �th�, �sh�, �ch�, and totally useless letters like �c�. Despite these shortcomings, we are still writing in English, not Latin. True, the languages of North America were not always English, Spanish and French, but these can easily be identified as invasive foreign societal DNA strains that have nearly wiped out all traces of the native species. Traces mostly remain in place names, such as �Susquehanna�, �Potomac�, or �Towanda�. Time does not permit the elaboration of this point, but similar trace societies have been identified in Sumerian place names.

The way civilizations both borrow and set up barriers can also be seen in this model. The borrowing process increases flexibility, while the barriers maximize strength. I will elaborate with a technological study of irrigation in the Persian Empire. The Persians are generally credited with inventing the qanat system of irrigations (Briant 2001). This was a system of underground canals to trap ground water coming down a slope and directing it to a location where agriculture and / or settlement was desired. By being underground, there was less evaporation, and it also provided a source of water along the way to its destination. What is not generally known is that the qanat system of irrigation is attested both archaeologically and textually in at least one Egyptian oasis in the Libyan desert, Bahariya, at a much earlier date; the reign of Ramesses II. In Bahariya Oasis, there are extensive tracts of land now covered by desert sands crossed by ancient qanat systems. These were abandoned since the late New Kingdom, according to the pottery remains. Textual records from Egypt clearly state that Ramesses II constructed a massive irrigation system in Bahariya to cultivate grapes for royal wine production. Likely, Ramesse II himself only borrowed this technology. Life in the oases of the Libyan desert lends itself to an organic development of the qanat. Its invention was most likely local to that region and ancient. Other factors, such as local gods inhabiting underground caverns and waterways, lend further support. Curiously, in his recent book on qanat systems, Pierre Briant (2001: 109-136) makes no mention of these facts. While the authors describe various local variations of the qanat system in neighboring Kharga Oasis, they fail to realize that variations are more likely in a region where a technology was begun, in much the same way that greater bio-diversity of a crop is in its native habitat.

The most likely scenario is that the Persians discovered qanats being used in these Egyptian oases at the time they took over the country. Then the Persians took that technology, modified it to their own cultural system and needs. They replicated a standardized version of it throughout their vast empire, thus creating a golden age of irrigation and agriculture, which not only fed their own empire, but also sustained Alexander�s empire, the Hellenic empires of his generals and finally the Roman empire, after which the systems collapsed from neglect, overuse, salination and other factors. I would like to extract the principle that the source of a particular societal DNA is most likely not an invading culture, but rather the location where there was greatest variation, just as one would find for a plant or animal. The potato was not cultivated by Spain, it was found by them and transplanted through globalization, with the results of increased food worldwide, increased population, increased social pressures, increased famine, increased migration, etc.

The �rise� and �fall� of civilizations follows a natural process, triggered by the degree of adaptability to the given situation. The concept of �other� is taught to socialize individuals into a strong unified group. It is akin to the constructors of identity, according to Castells. The leaders determine symbolic content of societal hallmarks, and what it means to those who embrace or reject them. Again, the American flag is a good example. It is burned in protest and worn in tribute. Barry Kemp described this a similar way in his book on ancient Egypt (Kemp 1989, reprint 1994). He claimed that late prehistoric Egyptian leaders invented their own high culture. This view could be seen as an extension of Karl Marx�s doctrine of class struggle. In Ramesside Egypt, there was a religious conservative backlash against the extreme doctrines of the Amarna Period. The artistic code also reflected a return to strict rules and a preservation of Egyptian elements. Ramesses II is famous for looting ancient monuments and re-inscribing his own name on them to be set up in new temple cities with giant propagandistic billboards proclaiming the evil influences of foreigners and how he personally controlled them. Meanwhile, there were many foreign queens in this period, and Egyptians enjoyed numerous foreign luxury goods. The two processes, globalization and socialization, are not only present at the same time... they fuel one another!

The social desire for group identity often intensifies in response to increased globalization. Often a less socialized group will be more flexible while a less globalized one will be ideologically stronger. The Babylonian captivity of Israel is commonly acknowledged as the time when Jewish culture and the Bible itself was molded (Isbell 1999: 112-126). There are countless other examples to illustrate this dualistic process. In the period when the Persian Empire dominated Egypt, there was a renaissance of traditionally Egyptian culture. In some respects, that period saw many slavish copies of earlier Egyptian masterpieces, but there was also an active interest in BEING Egyptian.

On the whole, the most successful moments throughout history occur when the two forces of socialization and globalization are most intense and balanced. There also needs to be a certain amount of pressure on the given society to spur on both cohesion and creativity. That pressure often has come from a particularly energetic ruler. Yet when that ruler is no longer in power, the force of socialization persists. When we look at the literature of Middle Kingdom Egypt, after the collapse of the Old Kingdom, social upheaval and redefinition of kingship, we see a deep understanding of the human condition. How is it that some societies can pick up the pieces, pull themselves together and even become stronger after the demise of their globalizing power, while other social groups simply vanish like smoke in the wind? The great nation of the Hittites is gone, and completely forgotten, except for a small group of Hittitologists, but Israel survived! Theoretical models of systems collapse do not fully account for some societies to survive such political events, while others cannot (Renfrew 1979: 64-85; Yoffee and Cowgill 1987; Tainter 1988).

Consider the golden age of Greece as manifest in the marble of the Parthenon, when Athens was confidently victorious against Persia and open to new ideas. The development of Greek society goes against the model of center-periphery. The Italian Renaissance is yet another era when there was no fear of embracing foreign influences; yet, each city-state was confident in its own identity. Again, the Spanish reconquista was a time when a strong religious nationalism was fused with a desire to take risks and explore the unknown, with obvious results. This balance between strong self identity and a strong desire to interact with others is the catalyst that makes room for greatness. In all these instances, the great change did not take place in the center, but in what was then considered the periphery of civilization; a fact that goes against what seems logical (Rowlands, Larsen and Kristiansen 1987; Edens 1992). Thus just as the model of primary and secondary state formation is misleading, so too is the model of core and periphery. Both models place too much emphasis on visible factors of a society�s might. They imply an ethnocentric bias that one society was intrinsically superior to another in the globalization process. Often the core of any civilization as it matures is too busy maintaining its own identity to be as concerned with expanding globally. In fact, this paradigm presents confusion between process (affect) and result (effect). I am not even convinced that the inheritors of democracy hold any patent to success; the jury is still out. We are beginning to witness the same contractions toward ideological demagoguery in United States society, as existed in the late Roman Republic. In both cases, the leaders played on the passions and fears of the populous to bolster their own interests. Where are the �weapons of mass destruction�? What is the financial benefit for defense contracts? . We are now living in that world, where the �emperors� have lost control of the globalization process. As in the story of the Chinese emperor, those in power have turned to military might to reassert authority.

You might have noticed that I have not yet addressed the issue of economics to any great extent. My model differs from Castells� in that I view the modern multi-national corporation as a pseudo-society or even pseudo-nation undergoing the same pressures of globalization and socialization. Conversely, all (other) social groups can be seen as corporations, being enterprises organized to regulate production, meet the needs of its members and particularly to benefit the elite of the group (elders, priest-king, pharaoh, or CEO) at the expense of the laboring masses.

The particular issues of a multi-national corporation directly relate to earlier institutions that competed with the nation states for control of resources. Some of the earliest corporations that functioned outside the control of the state, similar to the modern multi-nationals, were the pyramid complexes that provided for the �needs� of the deceased pharaoh in Old Kingdom Egypt. Over the course of the Old Kingdom, they account for an alarmingly high percentage of the gross national product, which could not be taxed by the given administration in power (Lehner 1997). As a reigning pharoah�s control over the country�s resources diminished, over time the system eventually came to a standstill. Part of the evidence is the decreased size and quality of pyramids and the land area allowed for later rulers. Eventually, by the New Kingdom, pyramids were no longer a royal prerogative. Private citizens of the Ramesside Period built small pyramids for religious reasons, especially in the Theban necropolis (Seyfried 1987: 219-253; Manniche, 1987).

Finally, an exciting line of inquiry concerning the question of societal DNA concerns the predictability of societal success, given a variety of situations. Historically, the most resilient and long-lived social pattern is that of China. A detailed study of its elements of adaptability to a host of situations would yield profound observations. It would be interesting to see how Chinese societal DNA compares with that of ancient Egypt, which was also long lived, but not as resilient to change. Do particular circumstances explain the survival of the one and the demise of the other society, or as I propose, is there a combination of factors, functioning as a cultural template, that have come together to make the Chinese social system the most resilient. In the end, we may learn more from Emperor Yuan than we ever bargained for. In brief conclusion, I view the processes of technology and communication leading to globalization as the affect that has always brought about the historical effects of change, as different cultures cope with the pressures of that change over time. Without the constant flux of globalization, �history� could not exist, as we perceive it in human society.

Thank you,
Sheldon Lee Gosline (gosline@egypt.net)

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For a complete list of conference participants click here.

The Following Reprint is an Article from the Bauhinia Magazine of Hong Kong, Vol 122, No. 12, 2000. It was the first time the Prof. Gosline introduced his theory concerning organic globalization.

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